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IN THE SUPR£1.1E COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT P. NORRIS and GU~? 
& AYERS REAL ESTATE, I~C., 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
Case No. 15660 
JOHN PRICE ASSOCIATES, IC;C 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondents brought an action for breach of 
contract, to recover co~"issions due from ap?ellant re-
sulting from the lease of ap~ellant's office building to 
IBI-1 Corporation. 
DISPOSITIO:'l IN THE LOII'ER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury on December 12 
and 13, 1977. The jury returned a verdict in favor of 
pJ~intiffs and damages werP determined by the court, 
tlH'Y rwing merely a r~:Jtter of :Jrithmetic cor?utation. 
The court entered judc;rr.ent on the verdict on December 20, 
1977. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents ask the court to affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
STATE:.;ENT OF FACTS 
Appellant John Price Associates, Inc., is 
engaged in the business of contracting, developing, and 
leasing real estate owned by itself or affiliates (R.267) 
Respondent Robert P. Morris is a real estate 
salesman who was employed by Gump & Ayers Real Estate, 
Inc., from October of 1974 to October of 1976 (R.l96). 
Respondent Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc., is a real estate 
broker (R.223). At all times pertinent to this case Morris 
had a contract with Gump & Ayers under which he received 
60% of any commissions he generated and Gump & Ayers re-
ceived 40% (R.224). 
Mr. Morris in addition to his activities as a 
real estate salesman, had been, in 1972, attempting to 
commercially develop property which he 01-med (R.l98). In 
connection with this attempted development, Morris became 
closely acquainted with representatives of IBM Corporation. 
In particular, Morris established business rclation~hips 
with: Vern Swenson, IBM's head of real estate for the 
western United States (R.l97); John Lind ~ho was Mr. 
Swenson's assistant (R.l97, 199); and Chuc}: 1:/oodwCJnl who 
was sales manager for I3'·!'s Sa]t LJK(' ofricc· (H.J9G). f·!r. 
Swenson and Mr. Lind worked in the Lo:; Anr;cdcs, Californiil 
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IBN office (R.l97). Although 1·1orris' own land development 
did not come to fruition (R.l98), he did become very familiar 
with the real estate and office space needs of IBM (R.l99). 
In the fall of 1974 Morris became aware that 
appellant's Meridian Park Office Building #2 would be avail-
able for leasing (R.200), and believed that the building 
would meet the needs of IBH (R.216, 217). On or about 
January 29, 1975, Morris called John Price, president of 
John Price Associates, Inc., and told him that he could 
get IBM as a tenant for the Meridian Park Development 
(R.201). Nr. Price, whom Morris had known for approxi-
mately 15 years (R.200), told Morris that if he would come 
down to appellant's offices, Nr. Price would direct Gary 
Machan, a vice-president of appellant, to provide Norris 
with a copy of the plans of the Heridian Park complex and 
a letter assuring Morris of a commission if IBM leased the 
building (R. 201). 
Morris proceeded to appellant's offices on the 
afternoon of January 29, 1975, and obtained the commission 
letter and set of plans (R.203). The commission letter, 
which was addressed to Morris, stated: 
This letter is to assure you that we will 
cover you on a 6% commission if a success-
ful lease is negotiated with IBM on the 
second building of the Meridian Park Office 
Building. 
The letter was signed by Gary Machan, vice-president of 
John Price Associates, Inc., in charge of real estate 
(H. 204) . Immediately aft:er obtaining the above materials, 
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Morris flew to Los Angeles and on January 30, 1975, presented 
the plans and a letter describing the building complex to 
Mr. Swenson (R.205). Morris took Swenson to lunch and ex-
plained to Swenson that he believed the Meridian Park complex 
was the only one that would suit the needs of IBM, in Salt 
Lake City (R.205, 206). 
Up to January 30, 1975, no one at John Price 
Associates, Inc., was aware of the particular needs of IBM 
in Salt Lake City (R.287, 253, 254). However, both before 
and after the January 30th meetin~ IBM was involved in a 
continuous search for new office space in Salt Lake City 
(R.308, 323), and Mr. Swenson testified that Morris was 
aware, from their conversations, of the needs of IBM in 
Salt Lake City (R.325, 326). Thus, Morris was able to 
match IBM's desire to lease a "shell space" structure with 
the fact that the Meridian Park building satisifed such a 
requirement (R.309, 216, 217). 
In addition to the plans furnished to IBM at 
the January 30th meeting with Mr. Swenson, ~lorris also 
presented space estimates on the Meridian Park building. 
The estimates were based on Morris' phone conversation 
with John Price (R. 217, 282). Morris left the building 
plans with Mr. Swenson and flew back to Salt Lake City 
(R. 206). On February 4, 1975, John Lind, an assistant 
of Mr. Swenson, phoned Mr. ~1achan at John Price Associates, 
Inc. (R.362). The call carne at the request of Mr. Swenson 
-4-
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and the purpose of the call, as evidenced by Lind's notes, 
was to obtain more infor~ation about the Meridian Park 
building (R.206). 
After the meeting v;i th ~!r. Swenson in Los Angeles, 
Morris kept informed of the activities of IBM through his 
contact with Mr. Chuck \~ood•,,ard, the sales manager for IBM 
in Salt Lake City (R. 207, 209). \~oodward was able to supply 
Morris with information since local IBM employees are in-
volved in an advisory capacity in the search for new office 
space (R.329). Morris continued to state to Woodward the 
advantages of the Meridian Park complex (R.208). 
Around September of 1975 John Lind was replaced 
by Ray Zimmerman (R.305, 306). Lind discussed IBM's need 
for office space in Salt Lake City with Zimmerman (R.355). 
Zimmerman saw the letter from ~:orris to Vern Swenson which 
also contained Lind's notes from his February 4, 1975, phone 
conversation with Machan of John Price Associates (R.312). 
Lind testified that IBM had more than a routine interest in 
the letter from Morris since the typical unsolicited letter 
received by IBM, relating to real estate opportunities, would 
be returned to the sender or a reply letter would be written. 
In this case neither of those procedures was followed by IBM 
(R. 364, 365) . 
That same month \~oodward, the Iml sales manager 
for Salt Lake, called the offices of the appellant and 
arranged for a meeting which took place later on the same 
-5-
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day between appellant and IBM (R.254, 255). After that 
point in time all negotiations leading to the signing of 
the lease agreement were handled by the real estate depart-
ments of IBM and John Price Associates, Inc. (R.238). In 
March of 1976 Mr. Morris learned through his IBM contacts 
that the lease would probably be signed (R.210). He 
called Machan and requested his commission, which request 
was refused and the resulting la1vsuit ensued (R. 210). 
ARGUHENT 
I. 
THE JURY VERDICT SHOULD BE SUSTAINED SINCE NO 
SUBSTANTIAL OR PREJUDICIAL ERROR OCCURRED 
Appellant in its Statements of Fact continues to 
argue facts that were resolved at trial. Such argument, 
however, is subject to the fundamental rule often reit-
erated by this court: 
This case falls within the framework 
of the fundamental principle: that what 
the parties are entitled to is a fair oppor-
tunity to present their respective cases to 
a court and jury for determination. When 
this has been accomplished, ~esumptions 
favor the verity of the verdict and the judg-
ment; and this includes all aspects of the 
conduct of the proceedings, and rulings of 
the court. The burden is up~Cl~ 
to show not only that there was error, but 
that it was substantial and ~dicial . 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake!Clty-v. 
Mitsui Investment Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 
1374 (Utah 1974) (footnotes omitted) 
(emphasis added) . 
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Further, this court has clarified the above rule 
by stating that "where the evidence is in dispute it must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict .. 
Whyte v. Christensen, 550 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah 1976) (emphasis 
added). See also, Isaguirre v. Echevarria, 96 Idaho 641, 
534 P.2d 471 (1975), where the Idaho Supreme Court in a real 
estate broker's commission case summarized the general rule 
that "[t)he findings of fact of a trial court will not be 
disturbed on appeal when based on substantial competent, 
though conflicting, evidence." Id. at 475 (emphasis added). 
Proceeding under the guidance of the above rule 
it is only necessary to sketch the scenario that the jury 
found persuasive. Through his own, independent efforts 
Morris became closely associated with certain key personnel 
in IBM who were either directly or indirectly working on the 
office space needs of IBM (R.l99), and matched those needs 
with the specifications of the building being erected by 
appellants (R.216, 217). Morris promptly communicated the 
above information to Vern Swenson, IBM's head of real estate 
for the western United States (R.l97). Relying on the fact 
that Morris was fully knowledgeable of IBM's needs, Swenson 
instructed his assistant, John Lind, to call appellant and 
obt"in further information (R.325, 326, 349, 362). The 
actions of Swenson and Lind were consistent with IBM's policy 
of constantly searching for new office space necessary to 
meet the company's anticipated growth (R.308, 323). 
-7-
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When Lind was replaced by Ray Zi~"erman, Lind 
informed Zimmerman of IBN's needs in Salt Lake City andre-
layed the information on appellant's building (R.305, 306, 
355). Thereafter, Zimmerman contacted appellant through 
Chuck Woodward, IBM sales manager for Salt Lake City (R.254, 
255). Woodward, with whoQ Morris had remained in constant 
contact (R.207, 209), set up a meeting between Zimmerman and 
appellant which launched the negotiations between the parties 
eventually leading to the signing of the lease. 
This reiteration of the facts clearly meets the 
above test which was succinctly stated by the Kansas Supreme 
Court in a broker's commission case: "[T]he appellate questic-
is whether there is any evidence to sustain a finding that thE 
efforts of the real estate broker were the procuring cause of 
the sale." Holloway v. Forshee, 208 Kan. 258, 491 P.2d 556, 
559 (1971) (emphasis added). Thus, if there were evidence 
to support the findings of fact in respondent's favor, there 
may be no further review of the facts, but only of the legal 
issues raised. Simon v. Electrospace Corp., 28 N.Y. 2d 136, 
269 N.E.2d 21, 320 N.Y.S. 2d 225, 227 (1971). 
II. 
THE JURY CORRECTLY FOUND RESPONDENTS TO BE THE 
PROCURING CAUSE OF THE LEASE BETWEEN PRICE 
AND IBM BASED ON PROPER INSTRUCTIONS 
FROM THE TRIAL COURT 
It is undisputable that in order for a real estate 
agent to receive his commission he must be the procuring cause 
-8-
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of the sale. In light of this rule of law, the trial 
court gave the following Instruction No. 11: 
To recover, plaintiffs must show by a 
preponderance that they were the procuring 
cause of the lease between IBH and defen-
dant. To be the procuring cause of the 
lease, plaintiffs must have set a chain of 
events in motion that finally resulted in 
the lease. If the events caused by the 
plaintiffs' acts came to nothing, and the 
lease was entered because of completely new 
and independent causes, then plaintiffs can-
not recover. However, this does not mean 
that plaintiffs must have participated at 
every step of negotiations or even in most 
of them. Nor does it mean that plaintiffs 
were not the procuring cause if others 
would have set the same chain of events in 
motion had plaintiffs not done so. 
The trial court's instruction properly defined 
the term "procuring cause" whether Horris is deemed to be 
a "finder" or a "broker." Therefore, the jury could properly 
find that Harris' activities satisfied the test of "procuring 
cause" under either theory. 
Although there are no Utah cases on the distinction 
between a "finder" and a "broker" the distinction is quite 
narrow. In Pennsylvania, the courts have described the 
distinction as follows: "Such distinction as exists between 
these two terms is more a matter of trade usage than legal 
definition. In general, a finder is an independent actor 
whose role is that of a middleman who introduces the parties, 
supplies information to one or both about the other and is 
required to do little else. Amerofina, Inc., v. U.S. 
Industries, Inc., 232 Pa. Super.Ct. 52, 325 A.2d 448, 451 
(1975) (emphasis added); Hinichiello v. Royal Business Funds 
Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 521, 223 N.E.2d 793, 277 N.Y.S.2d 268, 272 
_q_ 
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(1966) cert. denied 389 U.S. 820 (1967). The Pennsylvania 
court, in awarding the plaintiff his commissions, held that 
a finder must meet the test of procuring cause to earn his 
commission, but wrote "it is clear that a finder's fee is 
not dependent upon the finder's participation in negotiations 
and that it may become payable even though a third person 
brings the parties to an agreement." 325 A.2d at 453. 
The Colorado Supreme Court has stated that a 
"finder" is entitled to his commission if he "is the one 
who sets the chain of events in motion which results in 
the sale." Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts, 162 
Col. 149, 425 P.2d 282, 286 (1967) and in Bittner v. 
American Marietta Co., 162 F.Supp. 486, 488 (E.D. Ill. 
1958), the Illinois district court held "[a]ll the 'finder' 
is required to do is to bring the seller to the attention 
of the purchaser." In New York, the Court of Appeals has 
held that: "It is possible for a finder to accomplish his 
services by making only two phone calls and, if the parties 
later conclude a deal, he is entitled to his commission." 
Minichiello v. Royal Business Funds Corp., 18 N.Y. 2d 521, 
223 N.E.2d 793, 277 N.Y.S.2d 268, 272 (1966) cert. denied 
389 U.S. 820 (1967) (emphasis added). See also, Freeman v. 
Jergins, 125 Cal. App. 2d 536, 271 P.2d 210, 219-220 (Dist. 
Ct. App. 1954). 
Clearly, Morris' activities passed all these 
standards and Instruction No. 11 embodies the Color~do 
-10-
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Supreme Court's test which is actually str~cter than the 
other standards. 
The trial court's instruction c~ procuring cause 
also covered the possibility that respondent was acting in 
the capacity of a "broker." Appellant cor.te:1ds that the 
facts do not support a finding that Mr. Mo=ris fulfilled 
the obligations of a broker and that the j~ry instruction 
on procuring cause for a broker was prejudicial to appellant. 
It has been demonstrated, however, that :.!orris' actions 
clearly were the basis for the lease between IBM and appellant. 
An examination of the test for procuring cause for brokers will 
show that Instruction No. 11 and the actions of Morris, both 
meet the test. 
Appellant cites Brooks v. Geo. Q. Cannon Ass'n, 
53 Utah 304, 1978 P. 589 (1919) and states that it is very 
similar to the case at bar. Actually the facts of that 
case are drastically different than the present appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Brooks stated: 
After a careful perusal of the entire 
transcript of the testimony in this case, 
we are convinced there is not one scintilla 
of evidence tending to show that the plaintiff 
was the procuring cause in obtaining the loan 
for the defendant. . nor was she in the 
slightest degree instrumental in br1nging 
about the results finally obtained. 
The testimony is clear and uncontradicted 
that the only effort made by the [agent]. 
was that she. . communicated ·.-~ith either 
the Chicago or New York branch office of 
the Travelers' Insurance Company . 
Had either of these offices referred their 
communications to either the seneral office 
at Hartford or the local agency at Salt Lake 
-11-
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city, the plaintiff's claim of having pro-
cured the loan might be contended for with 
some degree of consistency. . Absolutely 
nothing resulted from plaintiff's inefficient 
efforts and attempt to procure the loan, 
as we view the record. Id. at 591 (emphasis 
added) . 
Clearly, the court was justified in reversing the 
jury verdict in Brooks where the plaintiff could not produce 
"one scintilla of evidence" to support her claim under the 
procuring cause test, but it is equally as clear that in 
the case at bar, respondents' actions were the only logical 
explanation of how the lease was procured. Appellant continue; 
on Page 12 of its brief, to advance unsubstantiated theories 
of how the lease might have been procured. Appellant specu-
lates that employees of John Price may have contacted IBM, 
or an unsolicited mailing may have attracted the attention 
of IBM,or Mr. Zimmerman may have discovered the Meridian 
Park building through an "independent effort." However, 
Price failed to advance any evidence substantiating these 
theories and the jury chose not to believe such speculation, 
but rather the plausible explanation advanced by Morris. 
Other cases cited by appellant are also dis-
tinguishable from the present one. In Hampton Park Corp. v. 
T. D. Burgess Co., Inc., 270 Md. 269, 311 A.2d 35 (1973), the 
broker's contract required that the land be sold by the brok~ 
and thus the broker had to participate in negotiations in 
that case. Id. at 423. In Reed v. Taylor, 78 Wyo. 216, 322 
P.2d 147 (1958) and Link v. Patrick, 367 P. 2d 157 (Alaska 1961 
the efforts of one broker were superceded by the efforts of 
-12-
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another broker and thus the former broker could not be the 
procuring cause of the sale. Appellant cites the case of 
Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680 
(1943) , where Justice Wolfe stated an evidentiary rule appli-
cable in proximate cause-negligence cases. Even if such a 
standard were held applicable to the case at bar, the evi-
dence clearly shows that the actions of Morris and the ensuing 
activities of IBM were not "conjecture" and Price failed to 
prove any "equal or more potent" probabilities. Id. at 683. 
In contrast to the inapposite examples cited by 
appellant is the clear holding of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Fredrick May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 
(1962). The court stated: 
[T)he extent to which the broker's 
efforts must induce the sale depends on 
the terms used in the contract and the 
understanding and intention of the parties 
in making such agreement and the facts and 
circumstances of the case. Usually, whether 
the broker first approaches, or brings to the 
attention of the buyer that the property is 
for sale, or brings the buyer into the 
picture, has considerable weight in deter-
mining whether the buyer is the procuring 
cause of the sale. The fact that the sale 
was consumated without participation by 
the broker in the final negotiation does 
not preclude him from recovering his com-
mission if the sale was otherwise procured 
by him. Id. at 269 (footnotes omitted) 
(emphasis-added). 
See also, Isaguirre v. Echevarria, 96 Idaho 641, 534 P.2d 
471, 475 (1975). 
Expanding upon the general rule stated above, 
the Kansas Supreme Court held ''[w)here a real estate agent 
-13-
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is employed to find a purchaser ready, able, and Hilling to 
buy on terms acceptable to the seller, it is not required, 
in order to earn his commission, that he bring the parties 
together personally or introduce them, nor is it the laiV 
that, in order to earn his commission, he must procure a 
binding contract signed by the purchaser." HolloHay v. 
Forshee, 208 Kan. 258, 491 P. 2d 556, 559 ( 1971) (emphasis 
in original). See also, Hueller v. Seefried, 54 \~ash. 79, 
345 P.2d 389, 391 (1959). Thus, contra to appellant's 
contention on Page 12 of its brief, it is not necessary 
that the agent deal with representatives 1-1ho are formally 
"authorized" to procure the lease. The agent need only 
"bring to the attention of the buyer that the property is 
for sale." See Fredrick May & Co. v. Dunn, supra, 368 P.2d 
at 269. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court has observed that 
"[t)o entitle a real estate broker to compensation, it 
is sufficient that a sale is effected through his agency 
as its procuring cause ... although the broker docs ~ot 
negotiate and is not present at the sale." Wilson v. Sewell, 
50 N.M. 121, 171 P.2d 647, 649 (1946) (emphasis added). Also, 
in Summers v. Freeman, 128 Cal. App. 2d 828, 276 P.2d 131 
(Dist. Ct. App. 1954), the California court held: "Where a 
broker's employment agreement does not contemplate that he 
shall procure a customer on certain terms, he is net obliged 
to bring the minds of the principa1_<l':l_d_ the custom'?_r __ t~-~ 
-14 
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agreement. He earns his commission when he procures a 
customer on terms to be arranged with the principal." 
Id. at 134 (emphasis added). Both appellant and IBM had 
their own real estate departments (R.238), and as the 
evidence indicates they negotiated a complex lease. This, 
however, in no way negates the fact that Morris was instru-
mental in bringing the two parties together and beyond that, 
the letter agreement did not require Morris to procure a 
lessee on "certain terms." 
Finally, appellant claims on Pages 12 and 13 of 
its brief that the 18-month period between Harris' presen-
tation to 1'\r. Swenson and signing of the lease somehow 
undermines respondents' argument under the procuring cause 
test. At the outset it should be restated that the day after 
Morris received his commission letter from appellant, he 
traveled to Los Angeles and presented the pertinent infor-
mation concerning the 1'\eridian Park building to Mr. Swenson 
(R. 205). Further, at a later date, !'\orris showed the out-
side of the building to Mr. Swenson when he was in Salt Lake 
City and !'\orris kept in constant contact with Mr. Woodward 
(R. 206, 207, 209). When confronted with the issue of 
whether an elapse of time would cause a revocation of a 
broker's contract, the New Nexico Supreme Court stated: 
"[W]herc a broker find6 a purchaser at the seller's terms, 
while still employed, !:~reasonableness of the time which 
~~-~Ci~; ta };£[1_ i_2___:l_~~ l EC!J:a l. " Erb. -~~_Halvk s, 52 N. M. 16 6, 
194 P. 2d 266, 270 (1948) (citiltions omitted) (emphasis 
-1S-
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added). See also, Equity Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. 
Trent, 566 P.2d 449, 454 {Okla. 1977). The cJew York 
court of Appeals summed up a strikingly similar fact 
situation by stating: 
"Tracing a connection between plain-
tiff's introduction of the business and the 
termination of the entire transaction was for 
the jury's consideration. . Here there was 
a time lapse of about eighteen months between 
the first Robosonic's meeting and the reacti-
vation of the deal by Toxin's call to the new 
president. Tracing a connection between the 
two is supported by the facts and the reason-
able inferences to be drawn therefrom and is 
not to be rejected because of the intervening 
lapse of time. 
Enough has been stated to indicate that 
the evidence, albeit contradicted, also sufficed 
to establish a continuing connection between 
plaintiff's initial efforts and the merger 
that carne about. The issue, therefore, on 
this score, is beyond review in this court. 
Simon v. Electrospace Corp., 28 N.Y.2d 136, 
269 N.E. 2d 21, 320 N.Y.S.2d 225, 229 {1971) 
{emphasis added) . 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST ROBERT P. 
MORRIS ON THE GROUND THAT HE WAS AN H!PROPER 
PARTY TO THE ACTION 
Appellant cites Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2-2,-18 
and argues that Robert P. Morris is not a proper party to 
the lawsuit. The evidence shows, however, that the agree-
rnent between Gurnp & Ayers, a registered r~al estate broker 
(R.223), and Mr. Morris, a real estate salesman {R.l96), 
provided that Morris was to receive 60% of all con®issions 
-lG-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
he earned and Gump & Ayers \·las to receive 40% (R. 224). 
For Gump & Ayers to prove their cause of action (for 40%), 
Morris is a necessary party to the lawsuit. (See Rule 19 
and 20 of the U.R.C.P.) The Utah Supreme Court stated in 
Young v. Buchanan, 123 Utah 369, 259 P.2d 876, 878-79 (1953), 
"Rule 19(a) does not permit one having no relationship or 
interest whatsoever in the conflict between the warring parties 
to be drawn into the fray merely because the real party in 
interest, -- who is barred by statutory provision from 
prosecuting the action in his own name and right, -- is in 
need of such person to circuMvent legislative mandate." 
(Emphasis added.) That obviously is not the case in the 
present appeal and the statute should not be construed to 
prohibit real and necessary parties in interest from being 
joined in a cause of action. 
In addition, a favorable ruling for appellant 
on this issue seems meaningless since the trial would have 
proceeded in the same manner without Morris. The same testi-
mony would have been received and there is no evidence the 
jury verdict would have been otherwise had Morris not been 
a named party. 
CONCLUSIO:.J 
The evidence clearly indicates that the commission 
earned by respondents was was justified and that Morris was the 
procuring cause of the lease. ~lorris spent more than three years 
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becoming acquainted with the needs of IBM and spent the 
same period cultivating personal relationships with 
employees of IBM. Particularly important was Morris' 
relationship with Mr. Vern Swenson, IBM's head of real 
estate for the western United States. Mr. Morris was 
able to quickly reach the one person who had responsibility 
for all of IBM's real estate matters in the Salt Lake area. 
Morris' perceptive matching of the needs of IBM with the 
attributes of the Price building provided the crucial link 
between appellant and IBM. Finally, the jury had the 
opportunity to consider all of the evidence and they found 
Morris' activity was the basis for the lease. 
For the above reasons the verdict of the jury 
and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GELD ZAHLER 
& Ayers 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed tHo (2) copies, 
postage prepaid, of the foregoing Brief of Respondents to 
counsel for Appellant, George A. Hunt of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau, 700 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101, this 16th day of June, 1978. 
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